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BEYOND RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT AGAINST THE
GUILTY BUT INNOCENT: LOCAL
REGULATIONS OF SECONDARY CULPRITS
JEFFREY A. PARNESS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated traffic enforcement schemes, employing speed and
red light cameras,1 are increasingly used by local governments in
the United States.2 These are not to be confused with red light
programs that are aimed at prostitution rather than bad driving.3 In
some schemes, traffic violations are pursued against the owners as
well as the drivers of the recorded motor vehicles. Here, the mens
rea requirements that typically accompany criminal code
violations are lacking. A form of strict liability for ‘secondary
culprits,’ those owning the vehicles, is justified because of their
ability to control the ‘primary culprits,’ those using the vehicles,
and because traffic accidents and their resulting injuries will be
*

Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law; Visiting Professor, The
John Marshall Law School, 2010–2011. Special thanks to Professor Lawrence Rosenthal,
Margo Ely, and Zachary Townsend for their comments and to Ed Laube for his comments and
terrific research assistance.
1. Robin Miller, Annotation, Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems, 26 A.L.R. 6TH
179, §2 (2007) (distinguishing speed cameras, operative since the early twentieth century to
enforce speed limits, and red light cameras, operative since 1994 to enforce traffic signal
rules). See also Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Toward Disaster: How Cleveland’s Traffic
Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 610–14 (2007).
2. Highway Loss Data Institute, Communities Using Red Light and/or Speed Cameras,
INSURANCE
INSTITUTE
FOR
HIGHWAY
SAFETY,
http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/auto_enforce_cities.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (as of
January 2010, speed cameras were used in 12 states by 52 communities and red light cameras
were used in 25 states and the District of Columbia by over 439 communities). See also Fran
Spielman, Red-light Cameras Yield, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Oct. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.suntimes.com/news/cityhall/1845842,CST-NWS-redlight26.article (189 red-light
cameras in use at the end of 2009 in Chicago). Plans to have 330 red-light cameras in place by
2012 have been shelved chiefly because of the city’s “worst budget crisis in modern history.”
Id.
3. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 457 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(describing Michigan’s “red light abatement” prescription in a case involving sex in a car with
a prostitute).
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reduced. Some empirical studies have demonstrated that reduced
accidents follow implementation of automated traffic enforcement
schemes aimed at drivers who speed and run red lights.4
While likely to continue to anger many citizens,5 the surge of
automated traffic enforcement schemes will also likely continue
since significant deterrence of vehicle violations may follow and
significant additional revenue for local governments will follow.6
As well, many violations charged through automated schemes can
be processed administratively outside the judicial article courts,7
freeing traditional trial court judges to handle the pressing business
of civil and criminal cases8 and freeing prosecutors to focus on
more serious offenses.9 Increasing numbers of secondary culprits
will be fined for the driving of others whose bad acts were never
aided nor condoned, and may even have been strongly discouraged
or expressly banned.
4. See Carie A. Torrence, Click! A Snapshot of Automated Traffic Enforcement Issues,
50 MUN. LAW. 14, 14–15 (July/Aug. 2009). But see Erika Slife & Bob Secter, Red-light
Cameras: First 14 Installed in Suburbs Show Mixed Results, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 18,
2009, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-18/news/chi-red-light-camerassuburbs-18dec18_1_red-light-cameras-tickets-for-red-light-violators-idot-records-showedcollisions.
5. Torrence, supra note 4, at 16–17 (describing the “public outcry in some communities”
over local government use of automated traffic enforcement systems).
6. See, e.g., Jason George & Graydon Megan, Red-light Cameras in Schaumburg
Screech to a Halt, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 15, 2009, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-red-light-camerasjul15,0,7535797.story
(red
light camera netted more than $1 million, but the program was ended after data showed no
reduction in accidents and local shoppers threatened to take their business elsewhere); Bob
Secter & Jason George, Red-light Cameras Raking in Cash, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 12, 2009,
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-12/news/0907110254_1_red-lightcameras-camera-tickets-suburbs (first red-light camera in Bellwood, Illinois “became a cash
machine,” generating $60,000 to $70,000 a month); Schwarzenegger Wants Red-light
Cameras
to
Terminate
Speeding,
USA
TODAY,
Jan.
18,
2010,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/driveon/post/2010/01/schwarzenegger-wants-redlight-cameras-to-terminate-speeding/1 (“Los Angeles saw its revenue double to $400,000 a
month from cameras at just 32 intersections.”) [hereinafter Schwarzenegger].
7. For smaller local governments, interlocal agreements could allow some communities
to utilize the preexisting ordinance violation bureaus of adjacent communities. See, e.g., H.B.
1186, 116th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2010).
8. Cf., Editorial, State Courts at the Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, at A30
(budget cuts and other budget woes are impeding “core court functions”).
9. Cf., Henry K. Lee, Many Contra Costa Crooks Won’t Be Prosecuted, SF GATE, Apr.
22, 2009, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-22/bay-area/17194086_1_prosecutedeputy-district-contra-costa-county (county’s district attorney will no longer prosecute many
misdemeanors, as assaults, thefts burglaries, vandalism, trespass and shoplifting, because of a
budget deficit).
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There are limits to local governmental regulation of traffic
violations involving secondary culprits. Besides public outcry,
there are state and federal government preemptions as well as state
and federal constitutional interests. The constitutional bars include
interests in equal protection, non-excessive fines, and due process.
Notwithstanding these limits, there is much room for
expanding automated traffic enforcement schemes aimed at
secondary culprits. Judicial precedents, to be reviewed shortly,
suggest that there can be expansions of non-automated traffic
enforcement schemes, as well as non-traffic enforcement schemes
aimed at secondary culprits involved with such matters as trash,
alcohol, and drugs.
Those seeking greater deterrence of
undesirable acts and additional non-tax revenues will pursue such
expansions.
This paper will first review contemporary local regulations of
secondary culprits through automated traffic enforcement schemes,
focusing on speeding, bad turn, and red light violations. It will
then examine the limits on such regulations, focusing on recent
federal court decisions sustaining automated local enforcement
schemes challenged on preemption and constitutional grounds.
Finally, it will explore potential new local governmental
regulations of secondary culprits in and outside of traffic settings
and with and without automated enforcement.
II. AUTOMATED TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT SCHEMES AIMED AT
SECONDARY CULPRITS
Today there are many automated traffic enforcement schemes
aimed at secondary culprits involving red lights. These schemes
have been unsuccessfully challenged in court, as will be
demonstrated. The challenged provisions are next reviewed,
followed by an examination of the judicial precedents.
In Knoxville, Tennessee, there is “an ordinance regulating
motorists approaching or at a red light.”10 The Knoxville City
Code states:
Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering
the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then
before entering the intersection, and shall remain standing until
green or “go” is shown alone; provided, however, that a right turn
10. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).

WLR_47-2 PARNESS

262

2/12/2011 2:48:06 PM

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[47:259

on a red signal shall be permitted at all intersections within the city
provided that the prospective turning car comes to a full and
complete stop before turning and that the turning car shall yield the
right-of-way to pedestrians and cross traffic traveling in
accordance with their traffic signal. However, such turn will not
endanger other traffic lawfully using the intersection.11
One of the methods utilized by Knoxville to enforce the code
involves a “red light enforcement program” which involves
photographing vehicles running red lights at certain intersections.12
Violators are subject to a “civil penalty of $50, without assessment
of court costs or fees.”13 Violators include the owners of the motor
vehicles that prompted citations for violations observed in the red
Yet an owner can escape
light enforcement program.14
responsibility if on the designated court date, the owner furnishes
to the city court “the name and address of the person or entity who
leased, rented, or otherwise had care, custody, and control of the
vehicle at the time of the violation” or swears “the vehicle
involved was stolen or was in the care, custody, or control of some
person who did not have his permission to use the vehicle.”15
Interestingly, in a similar enactment the Tennessee legislature does
not allow owners to escape a comparable state law responsibility if
the owner gives a name, the vehicle or plates were stolen, or the
owner swears the vehicle at the relevant time was in the care,
custody or control of a person without the owner’s permission.16
In Chicago, Illinois, a comparable automated traffic
enforcement scheme operates for secondary culprits, though
differently than in Knoxville. That scheme involves “cameras at
traffic intersections throughout Chicago” designed to photograph
vehicles “that either enter an intersection against a red traffic light
or make a turn in the face of a red light when turning is

11. Id. (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. X, § 17506(a)(3) (Municode 2009)).
12. Id. at 331.
13. Id. at 334 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1,
§ 17-210(d)(1)).
14. Id. at 333 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1,
§ 17-210(c)(3)).
15. Id. at 333–34 (quoting KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V,
div. 1, § 17-210(c)(4)).
16. Id. at 336 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-198).
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prohibited.”17 The registered vehicle owner is liable for a $90 fine
if a red light is run.18 Responsibility can be avoided, however, if
the registered owner “is either a motor vehicle dealership or a
manufacturer and has formally leased the car pursuant to a written
lease agreement.”19 Responsibility is assigned to the lessee
instead.20 As well, responsibility can be avoided if the vehicle or
plates were stolen, or the vehicle was sold,21 or the signal was
obscured, or the vehicle was yielding to an ambulance, or there is
an otherwise valid defense under “state law.”22
Owner
responsibility cannot be avoided in Chicago, as it can in Knoxville,
“by establishing someone else was in control” of the vehicle “at
the time of the violation.”23
In Chicago, unlike Knoxville, red light enforcement hearings
are done administratively.
The Chicago Traffic Code
“incorporates the City’s administrative scheme for parking
violations.”24
Administrative hearings for red light and speeding violators
also occur in Cleveland, Ohio,25 where the city uses “the parking
violations bureau for the initial appeal of the notice of violation
issued by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court.”26 Fines
can be $10027 or more.28 Adverse findings can be entered against
17. Idris v. City of Chi. (Idris I), 06 C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16,
2008) (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)), aff’d, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
18. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)).
19. Id. at *2 (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3)).
20. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3)).
21. Idris v. City of Chi. (Idris II), 552 F.3d 564, 565 (7th Cir. 2009).
22. Id. at 567.
23. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); Id. at 339
n.5 (“Unlike Knoxville’s ordinance, the ordinance for Chicago did not allow the vehicle’s
owner to shift liability if the owner was able to prove he or she was not actually driving the
vehicle.”).
24. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *9 (citing CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-050). This
scheme is described in Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning?
On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 14–16 (2007). The administrative scheme for adjudicating Chicago parking violations
was established in 1990 and has been upheld when challenged under state and federal
constitutional provisions. Van Harken v. City of Chi., 713 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(state); Van Harken v. City of Chi., 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997) (federal).
25. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(a), (k) (FindLaw through June 30,
2010).
26. Gardner v. City of Cleveland, 656 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755 (recognizing enforcement
occurs through Cleveland Codified Ordinance section 431.031).
27. Id. at 758.
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vehicle owners who were not, by way of defense, “driving at the
time of the violation . . . .”29 However, as in Knoxville, vehicle
owner liability can be avoided if someone else was driving, the
owner names that person in an affidavit, and the alleged driver
does not deny being the driver.30 Initial findings are made by “a
Hearing Examiner in the City of Cleveland’s Parking Violations
Bureau, Photo Safety Division . . . ,” whose decision can be
appealed before “the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas.”31
Thus, an automobile owner can be a secondary culprit within
local traffic codes, incurring penalties based on an operator’s
misconduct even when the owner was not directly involved. In
Chicago and Cleveland, administrative schemes are used to assess
such penalties upon innocent but guilty owners. However, there
are limits on such local traffic laws.
III. LIMITS ON LOCAL TRAFFIC REGULATIONS OF SECONDARY
CULPRITS
To date, the courts have sustained the Knoxville, Chicago, and
Cleveland regulations of secondary culprits through automated
traffic enforcement schemes, while recognizing limits on possible
expansion.
Challengers have raised concerns about both
governmental structure/authorization and individual constitutional
interests.32 The courts have suggested that certain future schemes
28. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(o) (FindLaw) (speeding 25 mph or
more over the speed limit or “any violation of a school or construction zone speed limit” incurs
a $200 penalty).
29. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
30. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw) (collection processes
continue against the owner where the person named in the affidavit denies driving). See also
McCarthy v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:09-CV-1298, 2009 WL 2424296, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
6, 2009) (lessees properly fined as they had an opportunity to appeal which they did not
utilize). By contrast, another Cleveland ordinance that allows vehicle forfeiture in a trial court
when the vehicle is “used for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense” permits
“innocent owners” defenses. CLEVELAND, OHIO, OFFENSES AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES CODE
§ 607.05(a), (e) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010).
31. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506 (LexisNexis 2010)
gives the right for an administrative appeal).
32. Critics of automated traffic enforcement schemes often have concerns extending
beyond strict legal limits. See, e.g., Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400,
2008 WL 782540, at *4 & n.2 (E.D. Tenn. 2008); Id. at *4 n.2 (technological advances and
local government pacts with private companies like Redflex “raise the Orwellian spectre of a
future where traffic control is regulated by a corporate ‘Big Brother’”).
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could fail on these grounds. Existing legal limits will now be
explored.
A. State Government Preemption
State law can preempt local automated traffic enforcement
schemes. State laws will preclude certain traffic acts from local
regulations where, for example, statewide uniformity is reasonably
desired.33 In those states where this is true, local regulatory
initiatives are forbidden no matter how reasonable.34 By contrast,
local schemes, and resulting diversity in traffic laws across the
state, can be facilitated by state lawmakers. Certain traffic matters
have been recognized by state legislators as needing local, rather
than state, lawmaking. Thus, typically both state and local
lawmakers regulate traffic, sometimes even the same traffic acts.35
Illinois legislators expressly invite some local automated
traffic enforcement schemes. The Vehicle Code defines an
“automated traffic law enforcement system” as “a device with one
or more motor vehicle sensors working in conjunction with a red
light signal to produce recorded images of motor vehicles entering
an intersection against a red signal indication in violation of
Section 11-306 of this Code or a similar provision of a local
ordinance.”36 The Code then recognizes local schemes may
originate in a “county or municipality including a home rule
county or municipality.”37 It further recognizes, however, that the
“regulation of the use of automated traffic law enforcement
systems to record vehicle speeds is an exclusive power and
33. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ryan v. Village of Hanover Park, 724 N.E.2d 132, 138–143
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (villages’ alternative traffic programs (aimed at speeders) disrupt the
uniform enforcement of chapter 11 of the Vehicle Code because they eliminate trial court
hearings and the records of traffic offenses being sent to the Secretary of State).
34. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-6-7a(b) (West 2010) (“No police officer may utilize
a traffic law photo-monitoring device to determine compliance with, or to detect a violation of,
a municipal or county ordinance or any provision of this code that governs or regulates the
operation of motor vehicles.”).
35. E.g., “Any incorporated municipality may by ordinance adopt, by reference, any [of
certain Code sections on traffic control] and may by ordinance provide additional regulations
for the operation of vehicles within the municipality, which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of the listed sections.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-307 (West 2010), which was
employed in City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 334–35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
36. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(a) (West 2010).
37. Id. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-300.1(c), (d) (West 2010) (authorizing only
certain named local governments).
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function of the State.”38
The Illinois Vehicle Code also sets standards for local
automated traffic enforcement systems directed at red light runners
and stop sign violators, among others. These standards include
mandates on written notice of alleged violations to vehicle
owners;39 confidentiality of recorded images;40 the manner of
proving the defense of vehicle theft;41 limits on civil penalties;42
and notices to motorists regarding the placements of motor vehicle
sensors at intersections.43
State government preemption can vary interstate. While
recording vehicle speeds “is an exclusive power and function” of
Illinois state government,44 local speeding regulations based on
automated systems are permitted elsewhere. In Cleveland, the
Parking Violations Bureau hears appeals by owners of speeding
vehicles.45 Where all state governments confront budgetary woes,
the cash cows born of red light enforcement schemes seem to me
especially susceptible to intrastate political battles over control,
particularly in such matters as speeding and other moving vehicle
violations where both state and local powers have often been
concurrently exercised.46
The Knoxville “red light enforcement program” was
challenged on state preemption grounds, with the defendant urging
the code provision “imposes a criminal fine,” not a civil fine, and
38. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(c) (West 2010). Other state laws
authorizing automated traffic enforcement schemes are briefly mentioned in City of Davenport
v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Iowa 2008) (“most states . . . have no legislation”).
39. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6(d) (West 2010).
40. Id. 5/11-208.6(g).
41. Id. 5/11-208.6(i).
42. Id. 5/11-208.6(j). Compare, e.g., City of De Kalb v. White, 591 N.E.2d 522, 524
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (no “statutory proscription of a minimum fine” for speeders prosecuted
under ordinances).
43. Ch. 625 § 5/11-208.6(k).
44. Id. 5/11-208.6(c).
45. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010).
The constitutionality of the Cleveland procedures was sustained in Balaban v. City of
Cleveland, No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at *7–8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010).
46. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, supra note 6 (“California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger
figures the cash-strapped and deeply indebted state could pick up another $338 million through
June, 2011, by using speed sensors in red-light cameras at 500 intersections to nab speeders . .
. .”). State action is easily undertaken at so-called EZ Pass sites on major tollways (where
perhaps speeding as well as toll payment failures could be addressed by charging vehicle
owner credit cards already on file in order to keep EZ Pass devices operative).
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thus is “an ultra vires act”―an act outside of local governmental
powers.47 A Tennessee appeals court rejected the challenge in
2008, finding that while the city program “triggered” certain
“constitutional protections” that attend proceedings aimed at
punishment and deterrence, the challenged red light enforcements
were “civil in nature . . . well within the police power of the City of
Knoxville.”48
B. Federal Constitutional Interests
Beside state law preemption, the Knoxville, Chicago, and
Cleveland automated traffic enforcement schemes have all been
challenged on varying federal constitutional grounds. The rulings
are now briefly reviewed.49
1.

Equal Protection

The Chicago scheme was challenged in federal court on equal
protection grounds because “it distinguishes between car
dealerships and manufacturers on the one hand and all other car
owners on the other.”50 Only dealers and manufacturers escaped
liability for violations involving their vehicles by proving their
vehicles were leased. As no suspect class or fundamental right was
alleged, the district court employed the rational basis test, which
allows any sound reason to validate a challenged law.51 The
reason given here was that dealers and manufacturers, but not other
owners, “‘turned over regular, active possession and use’” of their
cars, thus having no “‘day-to-day control over who drives.’”52
47. City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
48. Id. at 338. A review of the differing forms of state preemption of local automated
traffic enforcement schemes is found in City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 538–
39 (Iowa 2008) (express preemption and implied preemption—which can be based on either
“obvious, unavoidable” conflict with state law or “persuasive concrete evidence of an intent to
preempt the field” by state lawmakers) and Mendenhall v. City of Akron, 881 N.E.2d 255, 260
(Ohio 2008) (analysis includes consideration of police versus local self-government powers,
special versus general statutes and whether there is conflict between state and local laws
involving the same misconduct).
49. Constitutional challenges to local red light enforcement schemes have also failed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D. N.C. 2003);
Kilper v. City of Arnold, No. 4:08cv0267 TCM, 2009 WL 2208404 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
50. Idris I, 06 C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff’d, Idris II,
552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id.
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That reason was sufficient even if the lawmakers had no
“legitimate purpose in mind” when they acted, as “‘retrospective
logic’” can justify a law challenged under the rational basis test.53
The appeals court also found no inappropriate inequality, as a
legitimate goal “is to impose the fine on the person who . . . is in
charge of the car.”54
The Chicago scheme has also been challenged on equal
protection grounds because the central business loop
area/downtown is “‘exclusively segregated from these lights being
equally and proportionately placed, as they are in other parts of the
city,’”55 thus distinguishing drivers by where they drive. This
challenge was also rejected in federal court as there is “no
identifiable group of people who drive exclusively in the
downtown areas” and no “separate and distinct group whose
driving is limited to the outskirts.”56 As well, the Chicago scheme
was deemed rational in that it may well be the “high priority
intersections are not located in the downtown area” and that local
officials were looking “to get the most ‘bang for their buck’ by
concentrating on the most notable lawbreakers.”57 The Court
found rational basis review was appropriate because no suspect
class was targeted or fundamental right addressed by the
ordinance. However, the Court left the door open to application of
stricter review by noting that in this case there was no suggestion
that “the red light cameras . . . were placed in certain
neighborhoods with a distinct racial character or areas heavily
populated with individuals of similar national origin.”58
2. Excessive Fines
The Cleveland scheme was challenged in federal court under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the
federal Constitution.59 The challenge was rejected as the court
deemed the penalties were “proportional” to the offenses, with
53. Id. at *5 (statute passes rational basis test even if revenue production was the goal).
54. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 567.
55. Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at *4 n.4 (citing Cruz v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 1999 WL 560989, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
July 28, 1999). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230 (1976) (equality principles
may not be violated even if the law has “a racial disproportionate impact”).
59. Gardner v. City of Cleveland, 656 F. Supp. 2d 751, 763 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
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increased fines for more significant speeding.60
3. Substantive Due Process
Both the Chicago and Cleveland ordinances were challenged
on federal constitutional substantive due process grounds. In both
cases, no fundamental rights (and no suspect classes) were
involved;61 therefore the schemes were sustained as they were
found to be rational. The Cleveland ordinance was deemed
“rationally related to the City’s goal of improving traffic safety.”62
The Chicago ordinance was deemed to improve compliance with
traffic laws and could not be called “unconstitutionally
whimsical.”63 While $90, $100, or $200 dollar fines did not
implicate federal constitutional property interests demanding more
than rational government actions, the reviewing courts offered
little guidance on when fines would be large enough, and thus
more than modest,64 so as to prompt less deferential judicial
review. One federal district judge opined “fines and fees of over
$500 on car owners” who had no “innocent-owner defense” would
be sustained on appeal if rational.65
4. Procedural Due Process
Federal constitutional procedural due process challengers
must demonstrate that either before or after fines are levied and
perhaps paid, violators are not afforded adequate processes to
contest.66 In a challenge to the Cleveland ordinance, a federal
60. Id. (employing the proportionality test of United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,
334 (1998)). See also Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at
*5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010) (fine of $100 or $200 not an excessive penalty); Towers v. City of
Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 623–26 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting excessive fines challenge to ordinance
violations with $500 fines); State v. Forfeiture of: 2003 Chevrolet Pickup, Blue in Color, MT.
License AFH-845 VIN/2GCEK19N731269822, 202 P.3d 782, 783 (Mont. 2009) (the federal
constitutional excessive fines provision has not yet been applied to the states by the U.S.
Supreme Court). CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(o) (FindLaw through June 30,
2010) outlines the penalties for violations of the red-light enforcement scheme.
61. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 761; Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009).
62. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
63. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566.
64. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 763; Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566 (the property interest in a
$90 fine is “modest”).
65. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *7 (quoting Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 626
(7th Cir. 1999)).
66.
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district court found adequate pre-deprivation processes.67 Predeprivation process rights included “notice, a hearing and an
opportunity to present evidence.”68 Post-deprivation process rights
included appeals to a local trial court of adverse hearing examiner
findings.69 Similarly, the Chicago ordinance was sustained in the
federal courts upon procedural due process challenges. The district
court sanctioned procedures including: the “use of hearsay
evidence (i.e., the photographs captured by the automated
cameras);” the withholding by the City of exculpatory evidence at
initial hearings; the unavailability of an opportunity to cross
examine the custodian of the photographs; the lack of juries; and
the use of evidence inadmissible in criminal proceedings.70 The
appellate court concluded:
It is enough to say that photographs are at least as reliable as
live testimony, that the due process clause allows administrative
decisions to be made on paper (or photographic) records without
regard to the hearsay rule . . . and that the procedures Chicago uses
are functionally identical to those it uses to adjudicate parking
tickets.71
C. State Constitutional Interests
Beyond preemption and federal constitutional interests, local
automated traffic enforcement schemes have been challenged on
state constitutional grounds. Such challenges have been founded
on state provisions that appear comparable to federal constitutional
provisions, but nevertheless could be read to provide greater
protections. They have also been founded on state provisions that
expressly provide greater protections than are available federally.
1. Comparable, But Enhanced, Protections
In a federal case challenging the Chicago automated traffic
enforcement scheme, the trial judge correctly recognized that
comparably worded federal and state constitutional rights can be
67. Gardner, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
68. Id. at 759. (citing CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(k) (FindLaw
through June 30, 2010)).
69. Gardner, 2009 WL 2591621, at 5 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2506 (LexisNexis
2010)).
70. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *8–9.
71. Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2009).
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applied quite differently, with the state provision creating
“broader” protections.72 Of course, narrower state protections are
barred by federal constitutional Supremacy Clause principles.
A variety of approaches can be taken when considering
whether to extend broader rights under comparable state
constitutions. In one case, a state high court employed “six
nonexclusive neutral criteria” which included the language in the
state constitution and its differences with the federal constitutional
text; the state history; preexisting state law; structural differences
in federal and state constitutions; and matters of particular local
concern.73 In another case, a different state high court declared
that its role is to provide “the first line of defense for individual
liberties,” that may veer from U.S. Supreme Court precedents that
retrench on Bill of Rights issues or fail to “adequately protect . . .
basic rights and liberties.”74
2.

Broader Protections

Beyond interests comparable to federal constitutional
interests, explicit state constitutional interests, independent of and
different from federal constitutional interests, are occasionally
available to invalidate local automated traffic enforcement
schemes.
For example, the fifty-dollar penalty within the
Knoxville City Code for running a red light was recognized as
implicating the Tennessee constitutional provision declaring “no
fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty
dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers.”75 This
provision was said by one court to apply to all fines, whether
deemed civil or criminal in nature by legislators.76 However, in
the challenged Knoxville law establishing the red-light
enforcement scheme, the constitutional provision was inapplicable
because the fine was not more than fifty dollars.77 The court
hinted the provision would apply if the fine was over fifty dollars
72. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *8 (recognizing broader Illinois constitutional
procedural due process protections).
73. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812–13 (Wash. 1986).
74. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005).
75. TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 14; City of Knoxville v. Brown, 284 S.W.3d 330, 338
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
76. City of Knoxville, 284 S.W.3d at 337 (quoting Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248,
261–62 (Tenn. 2001)).
77. Id. at 338.
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and its primary legislative purpose was punitive rather than
remedial or if the fine, though legislatively intended to be
remedial, was nevertheless “so punitive in its actual purpose or
effect that it cannot legitimately be viewed as remedial in
nature.”78 Thus, Knoxville seemingly could not implement
schemes like those in Chicago or Cleveland due to its unique
constitutional provisions on juries.
At times, explicit and independent state constitutional
interests involve privacy. In Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois,
local traffic regulations must respect the Illinois constitutional
provision declaring: “The people shall have the right to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or
other means.”79 By contrast, the comparable federal constitutional
provision speaks to only “unreasonable searches and seizures” of
“persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .”80
IV. POSSIBLE NEW REGULATIONS OF SECONDARY CULPRITS
The automated traffic enforcement schemes in Knoxville,
Chicago, and Cleveland demonstrate that secondary culprits can be
held financially accountable by local governments in civil
proceedings81 for misconduct involving their cars that is primarily
undertaken by others. New local regulations directed at property
owners could be expanded under the supporting judicial decisions
not only to other acts involving cars, but also to other matters
traditionally subject to local authority, including trash, tobacco,
alcohol, and illegal drugs.
A. Adequate Control and Enforcement
In assessing possible expansions, one key guideline not yet
well-defined involves the degree of property owner “control”
78. Id. at 338 (quoting Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 264).
79. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81. Under Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), courts have found that penalties
against property owners arise in civil rather than criminal proceedings. Therefore, there are
different process rights that attend criminal cases. See, e.g., Balaban v. City of Cleveland, No.
1:07-cv-1366, 2010 WL 481283, at *3–6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2010); Shavitz v. City of
Highpoint, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712–17 (M.D. N.C. 2008).
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needed to rationalize regulations of property owners as secondary
culprits because they failed to oversee adequately the primary
culprits who misused the property. In Chicago, though not in
Knoxville or Cleveland,82 car owners cannot shift automated traffic
enforcement liabilities onto named primary culprits.83 Ownership
alone is a form of control that can satisfy due process.
The required control was found by a federal district court in
the Chicago automated traffic scheme because car owners are able
to “restrict . . . the use of their cars “ having “‘sole authority’ to
‘set the restrictions.’”84 The trial judge further observed, however,
that “a tenuous relationship” between a property owner and a
wrongdoer could not lead to owner liability.85 The federal appeals
court elaborated, observing that threats of penalty on property
owners prompt them to “choose” their property users “more
carefully” and to increase their “vigilance.”86 It noted that car
owners subject to the Chicago automated enforcement scheme
were like others subject to no-fault penalties, including a taxpayer
responsible for an attorney’s or accountant’s errors;87 a tenant
responsible for “a guest’s misbehavior”88 and a car owner
responsible for a driver’s use of the car in “committing a crime.”89
The appellate court also observed that even where reasonable
82. Compare CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-102-040, with KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF
ORDINANCES, ch. 17, art. V, div. 1, § 17-210(c)(4), and CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE §
413.031(k) (FindLaw through June 30, 2010).
83. In Chicago and elsewhere in Illinois, initial criminal, rather than civil or
administrative, responsibilities of car owners seemingly cannot usually be founded on laws
holding owners absolutely liable for misuse of their cars. See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 888
N.E.2d 105, 119 (Ill. 2008) (under due process, criminal statutes typically must hold
accountable only those engaged in “‘knowing’ conduct in furtherance of a clearly culpable
objective”; thus a car owner could not be criminally prosecuted simply because the owner
knew the car contained a “false or secret compartment[]”).
84. Idris I, 2008 WL 182248, at *7 (quoting Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 627
(7th Cir. 1999)).
85. Id. (citing Town of Normal v. Seven Kegs, 599 N.E.2d 1384, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992)) (beer distributor not liable for kegs that were misused by consumers who had received
the kegs from a beer retailer).
86. Idris II, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009).
87. Id. (citing United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 252 (1985)).
88. Id.(citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002)).
89. Id. (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 444–46 (1996). At times, by statute,
car owners may not be responsible for a driver’s use. See, e.g., People v. 1991 Dodge Ram
Charger, 620 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ill. App. 2d 1993) (only one co-owner found liable in car
forfeiture proceeding involving illegal drug sales by non-owner, because only one co-owner
engaged in statutory “conduct”).
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control failed, or was not exercised, car owners paying automated
traffic enforcement fines “can pass the expense on to the real
wrongdoer.”90
The appellate court’s rationale showed that property owners
as secondary culprits are not limited to vehicles and automated
enforcement schemes. In fact, the same appeals court had a few
years earlier sustained two Chicago Municipal Code ordinances
making vehicle owners absolutely responsible for up to five
hundred dollars in fines when illegal drugs or firearms were found
by law enforcement officers in the owners’ vehicles.91 In that
same case, the court reasoned the owners were culpable in that
“they must have given some degree of consent to the use of their
cars.”92
What remains unclear are the circumstances under which the
owners’ “degree of consent to the use of their cars” is so marginal
as to constitute tenuous relationships with the car users.93 Are all
parents, spouses, significant others, roommates and friends who
lend their cars in sufficient “control”? What about separated
90. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566.
91. Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1999) (sustaining CHI., ILL.
MUN. CODE §§ 7-24-225 (drugs) & 8-20-015 (firearms) (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through
Council Journal 2010)). Sections 8-8-060 (prostitution), 8-16-020 (children on streets at
night), and 11-4-1115 (sound devices) of the Chicago Municipal Code, which also impose a
fine for particular misuses of a vehicle, were also challenged by plaintiffs, as secondary
culprits. Towers, 173 F.3d at 621 n.1.
Today, vehicle owners remain responsible “for an administrative penalty of $1,000.00 plus any
applicable towing and storage fees” for drugs. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-24-225. In addition,
the vehicle will be subject to seizure and impoundment if used in the commission of
prostitution. Id. at § 8-8-060(d)(1). A “parent or guardian of a minor commits an offense if he
. . . by insufficient control allows . . . the minor” to violate “curfew hours.” Id. at § 8-16020(b)(2). The provision on “sound device restrictions,” Id. at § 11-4-1115, noted in Towers,
has been repealed.
92. Towers, 173 F.3d at 625.
93. Id. Similar questions regarding adequate control in non-property settings also arise.
Consider the Parental Responsibility provision in the Municipal Code of the City of De Kalb,
Illinois, section 52.130, which says this about the definition of “knowingly”: “This
requirement is intended to hold a neglectful or careless parent up to a reasonable community
standard of parental responsibility through an objective test. It shall therefore be no defense
that a parent was completely indifferent to the activities or conduct or whereabouts of such
juvenile.” DEKALB, ILL., MUN. CODE § 52.130 (2010).
As well, similar questions regarding adequate owner control over non-car properties also arise.
These answers might vary, for example, between movable and non-movable properties. An
owner’s car can be removed from the owner’s sight, but a building cannot. The DeKalb
Municipal Code section 12.01 on public nuisances declares responsibilities for a “person in
possession, charge or control of any lot, building or premises.” Id. at § 12.01.

WLR_47-2 PARNESS

2011]

2/12/2011 2:48:06 PM

RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT

275

spouses, or mere acquaintances, or strangers who are entrusted by
vehicle owners at the urging of others who are not strangers? And
what about employers whose vehicles are allowed to be used by
employees both on and off the clock? Absolute owner liability in
the absence of lease or reported theft would make proceedings
more efficient. Perhaps the fairness of such efficiencies should be
left to the body politic rather than to substantive federal
constitutional limits.94
Also unclear is the legitimacy of assessing civil penalties on
property owners with lesser control over property users when
penalties are not assessed on property owners with more control.
For example, in Chicago, car owners are responsible when their
cars are badly driven by spouses, children, or friends. But car
owners who are dealerships or manufacturers with written leases
are not responsible. Arguably, in important ways such lessors have
more control. In sustaining the Chicago ordinance, Circuit Judge
Easterbrook said a car owner who is not a lessor “can insist that the
driver reimburse the outlay if he wants to use the car again (or
maintain the friendship).”95 Often such insistence will not prompt
reimbursement. By contrast, lessors can demand reimbursement as
a condition of the lease (and have credit car numbers to secure
payments for fines, as well as payments for vehicle damage,
arising during the lease).
A second key guideline not yet well defined involves who can
be designated to charge secondary culprits with local government
violations founded on the actions of primary culprits who are under
“some degree” of control. In many local automated traffic
enforcement settings, similar to the Knoxville, Chicago, and
Cleveland schemes, local governments contract with private
companies to provide, operate, and maintain surveillance
equipment.96 Local governments have also been authorized
94. In rejecting an attack on the Chicago red light camera program, one federal judge,
citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., said: “When social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes.” Akbar v. Daley, No. 09-cv-1289, 2009 WL 3055322, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 18, 2009) (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985)) (citation omitted).
95. Idris II, 552 F.3d at 566.
96. The history of the Knoxville scheme, and the city’s contract with Redflex, a private
Australian company, is reviewed in Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-400,
2008 WL 782540, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008).
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themselves to acquire and utilize such equipment.97 There seems
to be little controversy here.
Property owners may also be charged as secondary culprits
after law enforcement officers observe others misusing the
property.
For example, since 1990, Chicago has had an
administrative adjudication scheme for parking tickets issued not
only by police officers, but also by “traffic control aides, other
designated members of the police department, parking enforcement
aides, and other persons authorized by the City’s traffic
compliance administrator to issue parking and compliance
violation notices.”98 There may be more controversy here if
charging duties are moved from police and sheriff departments to
others who are less trained and lower level officers, especially for
violations that require judgment, discretion, and accurate
perception. Humans may no longer be needed to detect many
motor vehicle violations. But they still are required for many
decisions regarding trash, alcohol, drugs, and other matters whose
regulations are significantly left to local governments.
B. Cars
Owners whose vehicles are misused, whether caught by
automated schemes or law enforcement personnel, can be held
responsible financially as secondary culprits. Owners may not be
able to shift liability by naming the primary culprits. Financial
penalties typically are fines, as in Knoxville, Chicago, and
Cleveland. Fines prompt in personam proceedings because the
fines can be satisfied with any property. Penalties can also involve
monetary losses through forfeitures, as when vehicles are seized
and sold for public benefit after use during a crime.99 Forfeitures
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-110.5(5) (2010) (limiting methods by which the
state and local governments using automated traffic enforcement schemes may contract with
vendors and manufacturers of automated vehicle identification systems for use or purchase of
equipment).
98. Van Harken v. City of Chi., 713 N.E.2d 754, 757 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing
CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE 9-100-030, 040 (1998)).
99. See, e.g., Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir. 1999). In Towers, the
Court said the following regarding a motor vehicle regulatory scheme:
[W]e agree . . . that any distinction between in rem forfeitures (which proceed against the
offending property) and in personam fines (which proceed against the owner) is one of form,
but not substance. Both proceedings result in an economic penalty to the owner because his
property was used improperly; both serve the same governmental purpose of deterring
unlawful conduct. There is only one functional difference between an in rem forfeiture
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became more attractive to governments in 1996, after the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bennis v. Michigan sustained a Michigan civil
forfeiture law over the objections of a secondary culprit, a woman
whose husband engaged in an illegal sexual act in the family car
which the woman jointly owned with her husband.100
Beyond automated traffic enforcement, Chicago imposes fines
on the owners of vehicles used during bad acts by others.101 The
police fined Robert Sturdivant five hundred dollars in 1996
because they “witnessed a person in possession of an unregistered
handgun run and jump into Robert Sturdivant’s car.”102 At his
final hearing,103 Robert could not “assert an innocent-owner
defense because the ordinance does not recognize such a
defense.”104
The final hearing may have been more complicated had
Robert Sturdivant’s car been subject to forfeiture for its misuse by
another. In Bennis, in rejecting a federal constitutional Due
Process and Takings Clause challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court
sustained a car forfeiture. However, the Court found it important
that a Michigan forfeiture court, acting against a vehicle owned by
a husband and wife after the husband was caught in the vehicle
with a prostitute, had remedial discretion regarding the total loss of
the vehicle to the wife.105 The Court explicitly noted that the
Michigan trial judge considered discretionary authority under
Michigan case law, including an ability to order a portion of the
sale proceeds, less costs, be paid to an “‘innocent co-title
holder.’”106 Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurrence that
proceeding and the in personam fines at issue in this case: The in rem forfeiture proceeding
results in varying economic consequences from defendant to defendant, based on the value of
the property; the in personam fine results in a fixed economic penalty.
Id. at 626–27.
100. 516 U.S. 442, 443–44 (1996).
101. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-24-226 (2010).
102. Towers, 173 F.3d at 622.
103. Robert never received notice of his right to a preliminary hearing. Id. He “was
without his vehicle for more than fifteen days before he was able to pay to have the car
released to him.” Id.
104. Id. The court noted that Robert was more culpable than the plaintiff in Bennis, who
had ownership rights with her spouse who used the car to procure a prostitute. Robert’s
culpability was distinguished because he had “sole authority to decide to whom” to lend his
car and “to set the restrictions and checks that were appropriate to ensure that the vehicle
would not be used to support illegal conduct.” Id. at 627.
105. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453.
106. Id. at 444–45 (the trial judge declined to exercise this discretion for plaintiff as the
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such discretion was important to prevent “exorbitant applications”
of forfeiture statutes.107 Ordinances setting fixed non-excessive
fines,108 rather than forfeitures, for secondary culprits remove “the
potential for drastically, or exorbitantly, harsh penalties on an
innocent owner.”109 Forfeitures rather than―or in addition
to―fines are seemingly more appropriate when the misused
property, though not illegal, has little or no significant value
outside of illegal conduct.110
Beyond unregistered handguns and prostitution, other nondriving bad acts occurring in or with cars can expose car owners to
strict liabilities for fines, if not forfeitures. In the class action case
sustaining the fine on Robert Sturdivant, the federal appeals court
noted that Chicago had vehicle-related ordinances regarding illegal
drugs, children on streets at night, and sound devices.111
A few Chicago ordinances seemingly penalize car owners for
the bad vehicle acts of others without any express indication of the
need for some significant degree of owner control. One ordinance
says:
(a) No person shall drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle within the City of Chicago while under the influence of

couple owned another car, so she would not be left “without transportation,” and the sale
proceeds would amount to “practically nothing” after costs, as the car was eleven years old and
recently bought for $600). Such discretion can also be guided by statute. See, e.g., 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/36-1 (West 2010) (a spouse of a vehicle owner whose vehicle is seized for
certain Vehicle Code violations can seek vehicle forfeiture to himself or herself or some family
member by “showing that the seized vehicle is the only source of transportation” and
“financial hardship to the family . . . outweighs the benefit to the State from the seizure . . .”).
107. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 457 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
108. See Browning-Ferris Industr. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(1989) (not reaching issue of applicability of Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to
states through Fourteenth Amendment). But see, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”) and People v. One 2000 GMC VIN
3GNFK16T2YG169852, 829 N.E.2d 437, 439–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying federal
constitutional bar on excessive fines to a state vehicle forfeiture proceeding).
109. Towers, 173 F.3d at 627 (viewing the discretion in forfeiture settings as “a safety
valve” that can eliminate statutory applications that “exact from the innocent owner a
forfeiture of property of exorbitantly high value in proportion to the owner’s responsibility”).
110. See, e.g., Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (forfeitures differ
when the property is pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, or tools of the criminal’s
trade); id. at 461 (the forfeiture of the third type of property is most “problematic,” though not
as much when the property is principally used for an illegal purpose because “the law may
reasonably presume that the owner . . . is aware of the principal use being made of that
property”).
111. Towers, 173 F.3d at 621.

WLR_47-2 PARNESS

2011]

2/12/2011 2:48:06 PM

RED LIGHT ENFORCEMENT

279

alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or
compounds or any combination thereof . . .
(b) Any vehicle used in a violation of subsection (a) of this
section shall be subject to seizure and impoundment . . . . The
owner of record of such vehicle shall be liable to the city for an
administrative penalty of $1,000.00 in addition to fees for the
towing and storage of the vehicle.112

A second ordinance deems the “owner of record of any motor
vehicle that is used for transportation or the solicitation for the
transportation of passengers for hire” in violation of the Chicago
Municipal Code is “liable to the city for an administrative penalty
of $750.00 plus any towing and storage fees” if the vehicle is
impounded.113
Impoundment laws sometimes create secondary culprit
liability for vehicle owners.
Local laws often authorize
impoundments of unattended vehicles for such purposes as
removing cars obstructing traffic,114 removing cars in “tow away”
zones,115 securing damaged cars,116 or recovering stolen items.117
112. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 7-24-226 (Am. Legal Publ’g Corp. through Council
Journal 2010).
113. Id. § 9-112-555(a).
114. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(a) (FindLaw through June
30, 2010) (“Police officers are authorized to provide for the removal of a vehicle under the
following circumstances: (a) When any vehicle is left unattended upon any street, alley or
bridge and constitutes an unreasonable hazard or obstruction to the normal movement of traffic
. . . .”); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(b) (“Members of the police department and
employees of the department of streets and sanitation . . . may authorize the removal of a
vehicle from any public way . . . under the following circumstances: . . . When an unattended
vehicle is unlawfully parked so as to constitute a hazard or obstruction to the normal
movement of traffic.”); KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, § 1798(1) (Municode 2009) (“Members of the police department shall have the authority to
impound any vehicle . . . under the following circumstances: . . . When a vehicle is parked,
stopped or standing upon an alley, street or highway so as to obstruct or impede the flow of
traffic thereon or endanger the safety of the public.”).
115. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(f) (“When an unattended vehicle is
parked illegally in an officially designated and marked ‘tow zone’”); KNOXVILLE, TENN.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, § 17-98(6) (“At any place where official signs or
markings designate a no parking or tow away zone”).
116. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(a) (“When a vehicle upon any public
way is so disabled as to constitute an obstruction to traffic and the person or persons in charge
of the vehicle are by reason of physical injury incapacitated to such an extent as to be unable to
provide for its custody or removal”); CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(f) (“When
any vehicle has been damaged or wrecked so as to be inoperable . . .”).
117. CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(c) (“When any vehicle has been
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When impoundments promote safety or property return,
assessments against registered vehicle owners are not punitive in
nature, but rather remedial as they are related to the costs of
impoundment.118
Additional impoundments are also authorized locally in
Chicago and Cleveland when vehicle operators violate criminal or
traffic laws.119 Again, fees are assessed against the owners. Here,
while some assessments may be described as involving cost
recovery, certain fees seem punitive. For example, in Chicago,
when a vehicle operator eludes a police officer and the officer
chooses not to pursue, the officer reports the occurrence. There
later can follow a notice to impound.120 The owner of the vehicle
stolen or operated without the consent of the owner.”).
118. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-080 (“The owner or other person entitled to
possession of a vehicle lawfully impounded . . . shall pay a fee of $150.00, or $250.00 if the
vehicle has a gross weight of 8,000 pounds or more, to cover the cost of the towing and a fee
of $10.00 per day for the first five days and $35.00 per day thereafter, or $60.00 per day for
the first five days and $100.00 per day thereafter if the vehicle has a gross weight of 8,000
pounds or more, to cover the cost of storage, provided that no fees shall be assessed for any
tow or storage with respect to a tow which has been determined to be erroneous.”);
CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.04 (“Whenever any vehicle, except a bicycle, is
stored in a vehicle pound for any reason, the person reclaiming the vehicle shall be charged a
storage fee of nine dollars ($9.00) for the first five days or fraction thereof, and thereafter shall
be charged six dollars ($6.00) for each day or fraction of a day.”); id. at § 405.06(a) (“In
addition to the storage fee provided for in Section 405.04, the following fees shall be assessed
against the owner or other person claiming an impounded vehicle: (1) An impound fee of
thirty dollars ($30.00), except that the impound fee shall be reduced to ten ($10.00) dollars for
a person reclaiming a recovered stolen vehicle. (2) A towing fee of ninety dollars ($90.00),
except that the towing fee shall be reduced to fifty dollars ($50.00) for a person reclaiming a
recovered stolen vehicle, and shall be increased to one hundred and twenty-five dollars
($125.00) for a person reclaiming a vehicle impounded incident to an arrest. The towing
charge shall be increased by ten dollars ($10.00) if a dolly or flatbed is used or if a tire or tires
are changed.”); KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 17, art. II, div. 4, §17100(a),(b) (“(a) To offset the cost of impoundment, including the cost of maintaining the
vehicle pound, all motor vehicles impounded . . . shall be subject to a fee of twenty dollars
($20.00) plus the city’s actual cost for towing. (b) After the first seventy-two (72) hours, a
daily storage fee of eight dollars ($8.00) per twenty-four-hour day shall be imposed.”).
119. See, e.g., CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 405.02(e) (“When any vehicle has
been used in or connected with the commission of procuring, soliciting, prostitution, soliciting
drug sales . . . or any felony.”); id. § 405.02(i) (“When any vehicle has been operated by any
person who is driving without a lawful license or while his license has been suspended or
revoked.”); CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 9-92-030(g) (“When a vehicle is in violation of any
provision of the traffic code authorizing towing and impoundment for that violation”); id. § 992-030(h) (“When a vehicle is subject to towing or removal under the Illinois Vehicle Code,
the Criminal Code of 1961, or any other law”); id.§ 9-92-030(i) (“When towing or removal is
necessary as an incident to arrest”).
120. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-92-035(b) & (d).
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used to elude “shall be subject to an administrative penalty of
$1,000.00 plus the cost of towing and storage of the vehicle.”121
Another Chicago ordinance states:
The owner of record of any motor vehicle that contains any
controlled substance or cannabis, as defined in the Controlled
Substances Act and the Cannabis Control Act or that is used in the
purchase, attempt to purchase, sale or attempt to sell such
controlled substances or cannabis shall be liable to the city for an
administrative penalty of $1,000.00 plus any applicable towing and
storage fees. Any such vehicles shall be subject to seizure and
impoundment pursuant to this section.122
In Cleveland, when a vehicle is towed incident to an arrest of
the driver, the standard towing fee of $90.00 is increased to
$125.00.123 The $35.00 differential seems punitive as to an
innocent owner who was uninvolved personally in the acts leading
to arrest.
C. Trash
Trash, like cars, is subject to significant local government
regulation. And like innocent owners of cars, innocent owners of
other property that is misused can be held financially responsible
for the bad acts of the those who trash the property and over whom
they exercise “some” control. Landlords arguably have significant
authority over their tenants. So do private homeowners or coowners over spouses, children, or others with whom they live, as
well as over guests. Fines can be levied though the old jalopy was
not created directly by the property owner of the land where it sits.
Short-term immunities, or opportunities to rectify upon notice,
would serve to remove what the earlier-noted court described as
“the potential for drastically, or exorbitantly, harsh penalties on an
innocent owner.”124 Remedial discretion is not limited to postcharge hearings in forfeiture proceedings; it can be employed
during pre-charge deliberations. Yet any such immunities or
chances to rectify seemingly need not be afforded under the due
process precedents.
In Chicago, largely innocent property owners seemingly can
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. § 9-92-035(g).
Id. § 7-24-225 (citations omitted).
CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 405.06(a)(2).
Towers v. City of Chi., 173 F.3d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1999).

WLR_47-2 PARNESS

282

2/12/2011 2:48:06 PM

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

[47:259

be fined for trash caused by others, as long as the owners had some
degree of control over those who trashed the property, even where
it is difficult to demonstrate lack of control. One ordinance says:
(a) No person shall deposit refuse in a standard or commercial
refuse container, or compactor, in a manner that prevents
complete closure of the container’s cover, or deposit refuse on
top of a container in a manner that interferes with opening of
the container, or pile or stack refuse against a container.
(b) The owner, his agent or occupant of a property shall not
allow any person to violate subsection (a) of this section. The
presence of refuse preventing complete closure of the
container’s cover, deposited on or piled or stacked against a
standard refuse container, a commercial refuse container, or
compactor shall be prima facie evidence of violation of this
subsection (b).
(c) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall
be fined not less than $200.00 and not more than $500.00 for
each offense.125

Similarly, in Knoxville an ordinance declares:
If the throwing, dumping or depositing of litter is done from a
motor vehicle, it shall be prima facie evidence that the
throwing, dumping or depositing was done by the driver of the
motor vehicle, or if the license plate registration number is
known, the registered owner thereof.126

As in Chicago, there is little guidance on the grounds under
which innocent property owners can rebut the prima facie evidence
against them. Given that the resulting fines would be small, thus
prompting only minimal due process notice and hearing rights,
even owners who could rebut will often be discouraged by not only
the uncertainties, but also the costs. In Cleveland, it is a “minor
misdemeanor” for a motor vehicle operator to “allow litter to be
thrown” from the vehicle except into a receptacle.127
125. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 7-28-261. Incidentally, it appears that there is another
instance of remedial discretion that serves to remove potentially harsh penalties on innocent
property owners.
126. KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 13, art. VI, § 13-194.
127. CLEVELAND, OHIO, OFFENSES AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES CODE § 613.06(b) &
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Beyond fines, nuisance abatements involving trash can be
directed against largely innocent property owners. For example, in
Cleveland:
The owner, occupant or person in charge of any property
within the City shall maintain such property free from any
accumulation of garbage, rubbish, refuse or other waste which is
not confined in approved receptacles for collection or so as to
prevent rodent infestation. The permitting of any premises within
the City to be littered with garbage, rubbish, refuse or other waste
is hereby declared to be a nuisance and unlawful.128
Such a nuisance can be abated by city officials, with “the
costs and expenses thereof . . . to be assessed against the property
and thereby made a lien upon it and collected as other taxes.”129
D. Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drugs
Alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, like trash, can be misused on or
in property, including cars, homes, and businesses. To the extent
property owners have control over others who use illegal
substances or abuse legal substances in or on their property,
financial penalties or other consequences for owners might follow
though the owners themselves did not participate directly in the use
or abuse. In Cleveland, an ordinance declares:
No person, being the owner, lessee, occupant, or having
custody, control or supervision of premises, or real estate . . . shall
recklessly permit the premises to be used for the commission of a
drug trafficking offense . . . after receipt of written notice from a
law enforcement officer that a drug trafficking offense . . . has
previously occurred on the premises, or real estate.130
It is “prima facie evidence that the owner or lessee” did not
“recklessly permit” if the owner or lessee “has begun the process
of evicting” the primary culprit(s) or “has identified for the
police[,]. . . after receipt of notice[,]” the steps taken to “prevent
commission of additional drug trafficking offenses on the
premises.”131 As well, an “owner or lessor who has filed an action
for forcible entry and detainer to remove a lessee or occupant from
613.99 (FindLaw through June 30, 2010).
128. Id. § 203.07.
129. Id. § 203.03.
130. Id. § 607.05(c).
131. Id. § 607.05(c), (c)(1) & (2).
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the premises” is not liable.132 In the absence of any of the express
defenses, seemingly, there is much leeway in defining “control or
supervision” as well as reckless permission. Those found guilty of
violating this ordinance have committed “a misdemeanor of the
first degree.”133
Real property owners in Cleveland are far less innocent than
car owners prosecuted under the Cleveland red light program, as
they must have received notice of an earlier offense and have
thereafter acted recklessly in permitting a new offense.134 It is
reasonable for Cleveland lawmakers to believe car owners are
better able to control their cars than occupants/home owners/rental
property owners are able to control their premises.135 These
lawmakers could also reasonably determine there is more user
privacy in the buildings than in the cars owned by others. Another
Cleveland ordinance reflects a recognition of diminished control
by premises owners as it declares that “a landlord shall give a
tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter the leased premises
and enter only at reasonable times,” where twenty four hours is
“presumed to be reasonable notice.”136
Business owners possessing certain licenses or permits
regarding alcohol sales can also be subject to greater liability for
the actions of others in the owners’ establishments.
In
Knoxville―within the ordinances on beer permit holders―a
permittee is subject to permit revocation or suspension when the
permittee allows any person to appear in the establishment or on
the premises to:
(1)Publicly or openly perform acts or simulated acts of sexual
intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation,
flagellation or any other sexual acts prohibited by law;
(2)Public or openly engage in the actual or simulated touching,
132. Id. § 607.05(c).
133. Id. § 607.05(f).
134.
135. While occupants of a premise may not be liable for fines arising from first time
illegal drug trafficking by others, they may be subject to eviction because they permitted such
first time offenses. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/11(a) (West 2010) (if lessee or
occupant, on one occasion, permits unlawful drug trafficking in leased premises, the lease may
be voided by the lessor).
136. CLEVELAND, OHIO, MUN. CODE § 375.06(a). In Chicago, a landlord usually must
give notice of entry two days in advance. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-12-050 (Am. Legal
Publ’g Corp. through Council Journal July 2, 2010).
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caressing, or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus or genitals;
(3)Publicly or openly engage in the actual or simulated
displaying of the pubic hair, anus, buttocks, vulva, genitals, or
breasts below the top of the areola of any person;
(4)Publicly or openly wear or use any device or covering
exposed to public view which simulates the human breasts,
genitals, anus, pubic hair, or any portion thereof.137

In addition, a beer permit holder in Knoxville can be fined on
a “per-offense” basis for “making or permitting to be made any
sales to underaged persons.”138 Here, owner culpability seems less
than required in the Cleveland provision noted above where
reckless permission was required.
As with car owners, certain business owners involved in
alcohol, tobacco, or drugs can be penalized for the bad acts of
others without any apparent need for direct and personal
involvement. No permission is necessary. A Chicago ordinance
declares that it is illegal for any person to “sell, give away, barter,
exchange or otherwise furnish any tobacco products, tobacco
product samples and/or tobacco accessories to any individual who
is under 18 years of age.”139 Upon violation, the person licensed to
sell tobacco is subject to civil penalties, even if an employee
committed the violation.140
V. CONCLUSION
Local automated traffic enforcement schemes as well as local
ticket writers are increasingly targeting property owners as
secondary culprits. Here, responsibilities often arise for owners
out of their failures to control others who misuse the properties. At
times, property owners are absolutely responsible for the misuse of
their property even without control failures. Property owners are
punished when others misuse cars, trash neighborhoods, abuse
liquor or abuse drugs. Commercial property owners without
137. KNOXVILLE, TENN., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 4, art. II, div. 2, § 4-74.
138. Id. § 4-75(1).
139. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-64-190.
140. Id. § 4-64-331 (“Every act or omission which constitutes an underage tobacco
violation by an officer, director, manager or other agent or employee of any person licensed
pursuant to this chapter shall be deemed to be the act of such licensee and such licensee shall
be liable for all penalties and sanctions provided by this section in the same manner as if such
act or omission had been done or omitted by the licensee personally.”).
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significant personal misconduct can be punished for conduct
involving tobacco or adult entertainment on their premises.
Secondary culprits are punished most often by fine. At times, they
are subject to property forfeitures. Federal and state constitutional
objections have largely failed to stem the surge in local laws
punishing innocent property owners, as have state preemption
arguments. Secondary culprits are especially easy targets for local
regulators seeking new revenue sources, (perhaps) as well as safer
and cleaner communities.

